Previous sharp oil price declines have been accompanied by elevated ex post volatility. In contrast, volatility was much less elevated during the oil price crash in 2014/15. This paper provides evidence that oil prices declined in a relatively measured manner during 2014/15, with dispersion of price changes that was considerably smaller than comparable oil price declines. This finding is robust to nonparametric and GARCH measures of volatility. Further, the U.S. dollar appreciation exerted a strong influence on volatility during the recent crash; in contrast, the impact of shocks on equity markets was muted.
I. Introduction
The dollar value of crude oil declined 51.2 percent in 83 trading days (October 1, 2014 to January 29, 2015 . 1 Since 1984, when oil started trading on futures exchanges, there have been only three other episodes with comparably large declines (Figure 1 ). The largest took place during the financial crisis of 2008/09 (oil prices declined by 76.7 percent in 113 trading days), followed by the 1985/86 crash when OPEC abandoned price targeting (oil prices declined by 66.4 percent in 82 trading days), and the crash related to the first Gulf War when prices declined by 47.9 percent in 71 trading days. During each of these three episodes, oil price volatility was about twice as large (above 4.6 percent in all cases) as the historical average (2.4 percent). In contrast, volatility was considerably less elevated during the recent oil price crash at 2.6 percent (Figures 2 and 3 ).
We use a number of nonparametric measures of volatility and a GARCH (1,1) estimate to document the "missing" oil price volatility during the 2014/15 crash. 2 Candidate explanations for the 2014/15 crash (e.g., OPEC's abandonment of price support) are consistent with large declines on the days that the market absorbs relevant news. Yet, the maximum daily decline during the crash (5.5 percent) was less than half the maximum declines during the earlier crashes and there was also considerably less dispersion around the mean decline-consistent with the narrative involving a measured fall in prices.
II. Empirical Model
We employ a GARCH (1, 1) model (Bollerslev 1986; Engel and Patton 2001) to estimate daily oil price volatility and identify the influence of equity market and exchange rate shocks using data from January 1, 1985 to March 10, 2015. The model is parsimonious and also widely used in the literature (Hansen and Lund 2005; Tsay 2010 ).
We begin by conditioning the oil price returns on the riskless asset as follows:
. 1 denotes the first difference of oil price, ⁄ where is the price of oil at time t; denotes the U.S. Treasury Bill; is a heteroscedastic error term whose variance follows a Gaussian autoregressive moving average process defined as follows:
. 2 ⦁ and ⦁ , represent logarithmic changes of the equity and exchange rate indices, respectively; the [+] and [-] signs are associated with positive and negative changes, respectively, allowing for asymmetric impacts of shocks from the equity and exchange rate indices. Taking expectations on both sides of Equation (2) gives:
We used the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) settlement price of the front futures contract as a measure of the oil price (because data are available from 1985); the US S&P 500 was used as the equity index; and the broad trade weighted US dollar index (from the Federal Reserve) was used as an exchange rate proxy.
III. Results
On average, the daily oil price decline was -0.86 percent during the recent crash, with -4 -considerably less dispersion around this mean during the earlier three crashes (Table 1 ).
The standard deviation of returns during the recent crash was 2.6 percent, similar to the historical average of 2.4 percent, but about half the magnitude of the earlier crashes. In contrast to the other crashes, the inter-quartile range (2.9 percent) was also much closer to the historical average of 2.3 percent. The proportion of days when prices fell by more than 2 percent was less than the other crashes as well (though greater than the historical average); the number of days when prices rose by more than 2 percent was also less than all three previous crashes and the historical average. Last, a measure of the proportion of 'stable' days (i.e. days in which absolute log returns did not exceed 2 percent) was much closer to the historical average than to values associated with the three previous oil price crashes.
To confirm these observations and also identify drivers of volatility during each crash period, we estimate a GARCH specification as discussed earlier, the results of which are reported in Tables 2 and 3 
IV. Conclusion
It has often been argued that we are now in an era of higher "commodity price volatility" (Dobbs et al 2011; McNally and Levi 2011 3 Volatility exhibited an upward trend after the 2014/15 crash ended (see Figure 2) . Notes: "-" indicates not applicable. The observation for January 17, 1991 has been excluded-it dropped 33 percent, from $32.00/bbl on January 16 to $21.22/bbl on January 17 (it was the day coalition forces invaded Iraq, consequently reducing the likelihood of oil supply disruptions). The 'fraction of stable days' denotes the number of days with absolute daily oil price changes that do not exceed 2 percent. Notes: One (*), two (**), and three (***) asterisks denote parameter estimate significant at the 10, 5, and 1, percent levels. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: World Bank Notes: Volatility is the standard deviation of the oil price (WTI) changes, presented as a 60-day trailing window. Notes: Volatility is the standard deviation of the oil price (WTI) changes and is presented as a 30-day trailing window.
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